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Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of the political and legal debate of the declaration of 
unconstitutionality of the referendum that sought the re-election presidential second 
term in 2010. On the other hand, it exposes the debate between those who spoke 
of bias and political argument in the court ruling related to the idea of “democratic 
security”; while others speak of the persistence of “democratic legality” consisting of 
autonomy guaranteed legal reasoning from deliberative processes. Finally, it is noted 
that the degree of institutionalization of discourse of the Court is an important factor 
that speaks in favor of it’s independence.
Keywords: Democratic security, Democratic legality, Presidential re-election, Colombia. 
Resumen
Este artículo presenta un análisis del debate político y jurídico de la declaración de 
inconstitucional del referendo que buscaba la segunda re-elección mandato presidencial 
en el 2010. Por otro lado, deja en evidencia el debate entre quienes hablaban de un sesgo 
y argumentación política en el fallo de la corte relacionado con la idea de “seguridad 
democrática”; mientras otros hablan de la persistencia de “legalidad democrática” 
consistente en la autonomía del razonamiento jurídico garantizado a partir de los procesos 
de deliberación. Finalmente, se señala que el grado de institucionalización del discurso 
en la Corte constituye un factor importante que habla a favor de su independencia.
Palabras claves: Seguridad democrática, Legalidad democrática, Re-elección 
presidencial, Colombia.
Resumo
Este trabalho apresenta uma análise do debate político e legal da declaração de 
inconstitucionalidade do referendo que buscava a reeleição presidencial segundo 
mandato em 2010. Por outro lado, ele expõe o debate entre aqueles que falavam de 
parcialidade e argumentos políticos na decisão judicial relacionada com a idéia de 
“segurança democrática”; enquanto outros falam da persistência de “legalidade 
democrática”, que consiste de autonomia garantido raciocínio jurídico de processos 
deliberativos. Finalmente, refira-se que o grau de institucionalização do discurso na 
Corte é um fator importante que fala a favor da independência.
Palavras-chave: Segurança democrátic, Legalidade democrática, Re-eleição presidencial, 
Colômbia
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Introduction
The Colombian state is a social state of law, which is defined in the first article 
of the 1991 Constitution. The question of a constitutional reform, intended 
to allow presidential re-election, put the meaning of this clause to the test, 
in regard to how the social state of law in Colombia relates to the imperative 
of the separation of powers that is expressed in the same article, as well as 
in the article 113th, in the chapter that deals with the organic structure of 
the Colombian state. The original constitutional charter only allowed 
one term in the presidential office, but in 2005, riding on a wave of public 
support, President Álvaro Uribe succeeded in passing a reform that changed 
the norm, allowing him a second term in office. In 2010, the Constitutional 
Court declared unconstitutional another reform of the same norm, which 
was aimed to attain a potential third term in office. This rule was stated on 
the ground that the aforementioned reform had violated procedural clauses 
while in its creation, and would constitute a substitution of an axiomatic 
principle of the Constitution, for which Congress lacked competence. The 
longitudinal variation among these two cases of constitutional reform 
provides for a good opportunity of analyzing both the vertical and horizontal 
integration of institutions within a context, which is all but conducive for such 
an institutionalization given Colombia’s history of civil war and wide spread 
corruption, that has had led the country to institutional decay. 
The Court has shown a remarkable degree of independence and 
ingenuity in arguing its stance against another re-election. It developed a 
doctrine (the substitution doctrine) that –not explicitly mentioned in the 
constitution– utilizes constituent power as a tool to curtail executive power, 
as well as the ability to reform the constitution, thereby taking away some of 
the numinous clouds surrounding the original people’s power. Furthermore, 
the investigation has shown that its independence relied to a large extend 
on the institutionalization of deliberation within the Court. There exists a 
deliberate and strategic intention by all judges to mitigate the outside exposure 
of the deliberation process itself –including their own personal positions– in 
order to minimize both external and undue pressure, simultaneously averting 
accusations of bias. As this paper attempts to demonstrate, the academic 
environment of argumentation in the Sala Plena (lit.: full chamber; the 
plenum where magistrates discuss constitutional cases), provided for an 
atmosphere of debate, within which new ways of legal thought could prevail. 
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The substitution doctrine is steeped in neo-constitutionalist thought, which 
invokes a novel authorization of political power, rooted in a pluralistic, and not 
unified, constituent will.
Because of the character of President Álvaro Uribe, the question of 
constitutional reform and presidential re-election becomes more pertinent 
yet. The Antioquian land-owner was a politician, whom united a healthy 
sense of mission with a charisma never seen before in the Presidency of 
the Andean Republic. Traditionally, the party system in Colombia has 
been of such a nature, that the President must be a skilled powerbroker, 
engaged into a network of patronage relations, by means of which the vote 
is managed. These relations have functioned like a check on the personal 
power of the executive (Archer, 1989; Archer & Shugart 1997). Uribe, on 
the other hand, fits better into the Caudillo President category, whom not 
only commands de jure powers, but also de facto powers. His popularity, 
rooted in his objective successes regarding the security situation, and his 
style of politics, that invoked traditional folklorism and communitarian 
identification amongst rulers and ruled, consistently has imply popularity 
ratings exceeding 60 %. Given this context, the Constitutional Court’s 
decisions also shed light on the tension that exists between popular 
democracy and constitutionalism (Arango, 2003). 
Actors, visions, and decisions
Uribe, Uribismo and Democratic Security
As it was implied at the introduction of this paper, the relevance of the 
Constitutional Court’s decisions is difficult to grasp without a proper 
understanding of the peculiarity of President Uribe in Colombia’s political 
history. Hence, despite the imminent danger of lapsing into an extremely 
narrative presentation, we cannot forego some words on this charismatic 
Caudillo. Often portrayed as the right-wing counterpart to Venezuela’s Hugo 
Chavez, Uribe does, to some degree, constitute the mirror image of the late 
Bolivarian people’s tribune. Uribe grew up as the heir of a rich Antioquia’s 
region landowning family –a region that was capital to the evolution of both 
the international narcotics trade and paramilitarism–. Uribe’s father was 
killed by FARC guerrillas. This event set him on the mission to completely 
eradicate the subversive group. Eradicating the guerrillas and bolstering the 
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state’s monopoly of violence became the main elements of the Democratic 
Security policy of Uribe’s presidency. Such a policy is built up on three pillars: 
1) establishing the clear authority of the state by means of amplifying its 
monopoly of violence against internal enemies; 2) fostering a direct relation 
between rulers and ruled in order to assuage social cleavages and create a 
strong bond of social cohesion; 3) buttressing of capitalistic institutions to 
invite direct foreign investment (Botero, 2008; & Gaviria, 2004). 
Three aspects of Uribe’s rise to power are important to explain the purposes 
of this paper. They highlight his comet-like rising onto the political scene 
in Bogotá and, , which is linked to his exceptional position in Colombia’s 
political history. Uribe squarely focused his electoral campaign on a non-
compromising position vis-à-vis the FARC, and on a “tough hand, open 
heart” approach to the nation’s security situation. In particular, the notion 
that “peace is the daughter of authority” (Uribe in Botero Campuzano, 
2008) became an incredibly valuable talking point during the presidential 
campaign, propelling him from a mere 9% in the polls to a 53% victory 
within four months. The FARC had left the peace negotiations in Caguán, 
and added to this fail, they have kidnapped presidential candidates Ingrid 
Betancourt and Clara Rojas, providing credence to Uribe’s constant critique 
of the aforementioned peace process (Viveros, 2002).
The second important aspect is that Uribe was somewhat of a renegade 
candidate whom, having Colombia’s Liberal Party as his political home, 
nevertheless decided to run as an independent candidate after the Liberal 
party nominated Horacio Serpa as its official candidate. Thus, he benefitted 
and accelerated the internal fragmentation of the traditional two-party system, 
which had existed since the mid-19th century; and managed to contain –through 
the inclusion of broker patronage relations– radial political forces that in other 
political systems in the region have driven democracies towards authoritarian 
regimes (Valenzuela, 1978; & Gutierrez, 2007). 
The third aspect of Uribe’s ascend to power became clear in the course 
of his two terms in office –mostly thanks to the investigations by the 
Supreme Court into what became known as parapolítica–. Uribe utilized 
regional alliances between traditional political leaders and paramilitary 
groups to bolster his political weight, and quickly build political alliances 
that hurled him from fame in the  Antioquia region (but relative national 
obscurity) to national power in Bogotá, the nation’s capital. Usually the 
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political trajectory is the other way around. How much he was personally 
responsible for fostering co-dependent relations with the paramilitaries is 
a point of contention. Not disputed is however that half of the uribista 
senators of the 2006 Senate were investigated for paramilitary ties (Lopez 
& Sevillano, 2008; & Lopez, 2010). 
Given the conditions prevalent in Colombia at the time when Uribe became 
president, Colombians were inclined to overlook these relations in favor of 
valuing his successes in exactly those areas where he had promised action. In 
hindsight, it is plainly evident that the first two years of the Uribe presidency 
were the most successful –measured by almost all general security measures–. 
The numbers of kidnappings decreased almost by the same rate that Colombia 
had witnessed them rise between 1996 and 2000.1  When he took office in 2002, 
almost 15% of the country had no police presence (158 of 1098 municipalities). 
This number was reduced to 0% in 2004.2 The intentional homicide rate 
reduced from 70 to 48 per 100,000 people, and so did the number of terrorist 
attacks and massacres. In short, Colombia moved from the brink of becoming 
a failed state to a state that still faces very significant security issues, but had 
made substantial improvements. These early successes are the clearest objective 
measure for explaining Uribe’s extra-ordinary high popularity ratings, which he 
retains to this very day, even though he is no longer President.
Armed with his own personal popularity as well as the widespread support 
for Democratic Security, Uribe positioned himself outside of Colombia’s 
traditional politics and political history. Thus, it is not surprising that 
his sense of mission would clash with the imperatives of the Colombian 
Constitution. His super minister, Fernando Londoño Hoyos, who was a 
staunch supporter of the Viejo Derecho and the old Constitution from 1886, 
stated before his nomination to the Ministry of the Interior and Justice that 
the country was ungovernable under the new 1991 Constitution. Uribe, also, 
1  Since the success of Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy is centrally contingent on the 
statistics around basic security indicators, it has been found that these are considerably politicized 
statistics. The Centre for Historical Memory has produced a study under the name Una Verdad 
Secuestrada, which shows that the number remained relatively stable and high at around 1250 
cases a year after 2005, only that now no parties to the conflict are responsible for the highest 
share of them, but criminal webs. However, my assertions rest on these numbers. It is important to 
note that these are post-Uribe findings. During his presidency, his successes in the field of security 
were not contested. See: http://www.cifrasyconceptos.com/secuestro/presentacion_reportes.php. 
2  See http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB327/doc13_20050000.pdf
17
JAN BOESTEN
ISSN 1657-6535
laid out an extensive political reform project that concerned the political 
charter. Between 1999 and 2009, there were a total of 22 constitutional 
reforms initiated –seven under President Andrés Pastrana and 15 during the 
two terms of the Uribe administration– (Valencia, 2012). 
The contours of the pro-reform argumentation were squarely majoritarian, 
running under the banner of the Estadio Communitario and the Estado de 
Opinión (Valencia, 2012). The President Uribe, and his most important advisor 
in strategic and ideological questions, José Obdulio Gaviria, argued that the 
“general will is good and to understand it does not require war, but dialectic” 
(Gaviria, 2004:35). He argued that upholding the majority’s will does not 
necessarily entail a war of passions undermining the democratic nature of 
the regime itself, neither does it collide with the empire of law. It does limit 
the empire of law, however, to the universe of forms –at least when political 
processes of decision-making are involved– (Gaviria, 2004:51). 
The majoritarian coloration of Uribe’s public policy is most readily apparent 
in its second element, namely, direct identification between rulers and ruled 
in order to bolster social cohesion and assuage economic cleavages. It rests 
on a particular notion of social trust that buttresses a peculiar understanding 
of charismatic, political leadership. Dialectically interpreting and finding the 
general will means “that everything can be negotiated and come to a conclusion 
with a majority without the use of violence […] through a permanent dialogue 
of the government with the society”.3 He also said that the result is a relation 
between rulers and ruled that only propels the most prudent and virtuous 
leaders to national supremacy. Social trust in this context, of course, does not 
entail the type of trust that constitutional democracies savor from –namely 
generalized and rationalized forms of trust–. Rather, Uribismo rests on notions 
of leadership that invoke a coherent vision of life with a corresponding moral 
universe that separates the leader from the particularized interests that make 
up society’s life world.
When it comes to constitutional issues, these elements of Uribismo coalesce 
into the concept of the Estado de Opinion (state of opinion). The semantic 
relation with the Estado de Derecho (state of law, rule of law) is deliberate as is 
the impreciseness of whether it is superior or equal to the Estado de Derecho. 
It is essentially a redressing of Bickel’s counter-majoritarian problem: since 
3  Interviews.
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the courts lack the direct democratic legitimacy of an elected body such as 
Congress or the President, it only accepts formal limitations on popular power, 
but not substantial ones.  The general articulation of the Estado de Opinión as 
well as its generic application to all courts –be they penal or constitutional– 
have received reasoned critiques against Uribismo, which are characterized for 
reprimanding the doctrine on the basis of this impreciseness in its definition, 
since it leaves the gates open for the abuse of popular power. To them, it is 
simply a political category that is mingling in judicial waters. On the other 
hand, for uribistas support for re-election becomes not only a preference, but 
an imperative, since the prevention of good leadership undermines the good 
of the entire nation (Gaviria, 2004).
Constitutionalism in a new key: the Constitution from 1991, the Constitutional 
Court and constitutional reform.
The new Colombian Constitution, promulgated in 1991, was born in an 
acute crisis moment in Colombia’s history. Drug traffickers and guerrillas had 
brought the state to the brink of collapse and, in particular, Pablo Escobar’s 
armies of Sicarios terrorized Colombia’s civilian population and public 
institutions.4 Constituents reckoned two problems which were supposed to 
be at the root of the regime crisis: excessive executive powers and privileges, 
and a lack of political inclusion and institutional flexibility. To redress these 
structural grievances, the constituent assembly decided on mechanisms to 
limit presidential power, which included, amongst other things, a one-term 
limit (Art. 152), and flexible mechanisms to reform the constitution, which 
limited to procedural claims the imperative of the Constitutional Court to 
review such reforms (Art. 241, 1. & 2.). 
4  The arrival of the international cocaine trade in the late 1970s and 1980s accentuated the 
fragility of the Colombian state, which had its roots in the politics of the 19th century (Centeno, 
2002; ). The narcotics trade brought new violent actors to the forefront (drug traffickers’ private 
armies that later morphed into loosely connected paramilitary groups) and strengthened existing 
ones (the FARC). By the late 1980s, drug king pin Pablo Escobar had declared war on Colombia’s 
institutions, killing thousands in a terror war with which he fought against the extradition to the 
United States. The abundance of violence and terror that gripped the Andean nations public 
life, moved a group of student to campaign for fundamental political change. Activists identified 
the exclusionary nature of the current political system as the chief underlying reason for the 
political crisis that had resulted in the copious violence. Consequently, they argued that only a 
new constitution could appease the conflict and shift the sphere of action from violence between 
actors outside institutions to negotiations between parties within institutions.
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The explicit contention of the Constitution which stated that the 
Constitutional Court could only review the formal and not the material aspects 
of reforms, preconfigured the clash that would arise between an executive and 
legislature that view the right to reform the constitution on their side, and an 
activist court that had internalized the imperative to guard the integrity of the 
constitution. The motivation of the Constitutional Court to fulfill the role of 
the guardian of the constitution with more exuberance is partly explained by the 
fact that the Court –or important sections of it– viewed the 1991 Constitution 
as a fundamentally distinct document from the 1886 Constitution, the latter 
being born out of the factional clashes between conservatives and liberals in the 
formative years of the Colombian state, and the former as the integral document 
of a peace accord between the Colombian state and non-state armed actors.5
Accompanying the creation and establishment of the new Constitution 
and the Constitutional Court has been the articulation of what in 
Colombia’s legal thought terms is known as Nuevo Derecho. Distinguishing 
itself from the Viejo Derecho of the 1886 Constitution, its relation to neo-
constitutionalism is readily apparent with the inclusion of an expansive 
catalogue of rights that encompasses first (private rights), second (social 
rights), and third (collective cultural rights) generational rights, as well as 
mechanisms (Tutela) intended to directly enforce these rights.6 
Important for the purposes of this essay are the novel principles of interpreting 
constitutional clauses implicit in Nuevo Derecho. The above cited formalism, 
strictness, and rigidness of the Viejo Derecho arose, in part,from its jurisprudential 
heritage, which is mostly French-Continental. The 1886 Constitution was 
integrally concerned with the organic structure of the state, which only included 
a limited charter of rights subsumed under the civil code, which were not 
presented as autonomous constitutional norms. The 1910 and 1911 established 
principle of judicial review almost exclusively concerned itself with interpreting 
the principle of legality. This principle implies that “public forces are only 
allowed to do what the law allows them to do”.7 Interviewees explained that 
legality as the guiding principle of constitutional interpretation lends itself to a 
legal positivism that limits the role of jurisprudence. Also, it can function as an 
effective control on executive power, as Colombia’s Supreme Court had shown 
5  Interviews.
6  The Tutela is the Colombian equivalent to the German Verfassungsbeschwerde. 
7  Interviews.
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in various decisions curtailing the reform activism of presidents. Its formalism, 
however, also resulted in an undue institutional and socio-political rigidness that 
greatly restricted the arena for political action. 
Nuevo Derecho does not condemn the principle of legality and formalism 
to irrelevance.  Rather, it nuances its strictness by complimenting it with 
neo-constitutionalist principles of interpretation. Beyond legality, the 
Constitutional Court also weighs the proportionality, rationality, and efficacy 
of reforms and laws. As this essay will show, in regards to constitutional norms 
guiding reform of the charter, the result is somewhat paradoxical. On the 
one hand, the new Constitution limits the ability to review reforms to formal 
review, but on the other hand, expands the scope of interpretive principles by 
embracing a new ethos in the authorization of political power. Thus, when the 
Constitutional Court argues that the idea of a sovereign people accompanying 
the conceptualization of liberal democracy becomes unintelligible without 
inclusion of a plurality and coexistence of different ideas, races, genders, 
origins, religions and social groups, it tacitly embraces a limitation of political 
power that is not solely bound by the written word of the Constitution. The 
principles behind plurality and co-existence reject simple majoritarianism and 
have transformed Colombia’s political charter from a written document into a 
living constitution embedded in its context and socio-political reality.8 
This tendency is nowhere as explicitly visible as in the Court’s jurisprudence 
concerning constitutional reform and the separation of powers. To proceed then, 
I will lay out the argumentation in each decision concerning presidential re-
election, which will show a careful attention to procedure and form, but also the 
invocation of what is called the doctrine of the substitution of the constitution. 
This doctrine is at the canopy of the shift from Viejo Derecho to Nuevo Derecho, 
and manifestly shows the Court’s determination and conceptual ingenuity to 
limit the ability of reforming the Constitution, despite the limitation, placed 
upon its own capability by the norm, to only let formal review prevail. 
The two decisions
The Colombian Constitution provides three ways for amending the 
charter and its norms: by legislative initiative through Congress, a popular 
referendum (that passes through Congress), and a constituent assembly. 
8  Interviews.
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In the first instance of constitutional reform to allow a second presidential 
term in 2004, the route taken was the ordinary legislative procedure through 
Congress. In the second instance in 2009, a citizens’ initiative commenced 
the reform process. Such an initiative called upon the Congress to pass a 
law which would make possible a referendum. Thus, even though the 
origin of the referendum is plebiscitary in nature, it also passes through the 
Colombia’s formal political institutional order. Regardless of the taken path, 
the legal questions the Constitutional Court addressed were the same: Were 
procedural norms violated in the creation of the reform process and did the 
reform amount to a substitution of the constitution or of principle parts/norms 
thereof?.9 The theory of the substitution of the constitution is an evolution 
of the doctrine of competence that is implied in the notion of procedure. As 
is detailed below, that doctrine expands the Court’s procedural review rights 
by invoking the distinction between constituent and constituted power, in 
order to subject constitutional reforms to a test of competence concerning 
that differentiation. Opponents of the theory argue that this amounts to 
judicial decisionism and is itself a substitution of the constitution, for the 
political charter does not distribute the competence to detect its axiomatic 
principles to any particular political institution.10 
C-141/05
Law 02 of 2004 commenced the reform process and it took a somewhat 
tumultuous path through Colombia’s legislative institutions. There was a 
total of ten complaints tabled. Opponents of the reform argued that the 
authors of the reform disowned the principle of the separation of powers 
by having the executive assist in legislative debates. The required first 
reading in the first committee of the Senate was disintegrated due to the 
absence of the Vice-President of the Senate; an open debate in Congress 
was suppressed when the President of the Chamber of Representatives 
ordered the vote to go forward, inJune 17th, 2004, when opposition 
members were not present out of protest; the exact text of the reform was 
not published 24 hours prior to debate in the Congressional Gazette, as 
is demanded by the Constitution, nor were citizens interventions during 
the debates published in the Gazette; and finally, complaints by fellow 
9  See Corte Constitucional de Colombia. C-1040/05 & C-141/10. 
10  See in particular Humberto Sierra Porto’s dissent in C-1040/05. 
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representative Germán Navas Talero against Yidis Medina which were 
related with her last minute change of vote were not given sufficient voice 
in the process.11
In the end, the Court only declared unconstitucional a statutory law 
accompanying the reform, and let its substance pass, on the condition that any 
unfair advantage that incumbents might have over their electoral competitors 
should be assuaged. It argued that 
The essential elements that define a social and democratic system based 
on the rule of law, [and] on human dignity, were not replaced in this 
reform. The sovereign people will decide whom to elect to the presidency, 
the institutions with supervisory or overseer roles in electoral matters 
completely preserve their powers, the checks and balances system is still 
operating, the independence of the government branches is granted, 
the executive branch does not receive new powers, the reform contains 
rules to reduce the inequality in the electoral competition, which will 
be enforced by independent entities, and their decisions will continue 
to be subject to judicial review, to protect the rule of law (C-1040/05). 
It tested the application of the doctrine of the substitution of the constitution, 
but found that “It is not enough to remark that the reason that may have 
inspired the drafters of the constitution to prohibit a presidential reelection 
are nowadays valid standards by which to conclude that the elimination of 
such a prohibition amounts to a substitution of the Constitution”. On the 
contrary, the magistrates’ analysis resulted in the opposite conclusion, namely 
that a constitution requires clauses and mechanisms to be updated when the 
11  What is now known as Yidispolítica, involved two congressmen, Yidis Medina and Teodolindo 
Avendaño, who, at first, opposed the reform in Congress. However, in a crucial vote in the 
committee stage, in the House of Representatives, both changed their mind at the last minute, and 
tilted the vote in favor of the progress of the reform - Medina argued that pork barrel promises by 
the President changed her mind, and Avendaño cited divine intervention. The political scandal 
carrying Medina’s first name became hugely important in the second Uribe term, and in the prelude 
to the second attempt to change the Constitution for another re-election. Apparently, it was not 
only divine intervention and pork barrel spending that caused the change of mind of Medina and 
Avendaño, but material promises that, as the Supreme Court found in 2009, amounted to indictable 
offenses under Colombian law. Medina is currently serving time in prison for those actions. Since 
their vote had crucially tilted the ballot in the committee stage, the Constitutional Court would 
have decided against the reform on procedural grounds if both had been indicted by a judicial 
decision, which would have invalidated the vote (interviews by the author). 
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social and political reality requires it (C-1040/05). Consequently, Uribe ran 
again in 2006 and handedly won re-election in the first round of Presidential 
elections by a margin of 40 percentage points (Registraduría, 2006).
C-141/10
The second term in office was more tumultuous for Uribe, and the question 
of re-election turned up again at the Constitutional Court.12 Uribe still 
commanded popularity ratings for a number above 60 percent, and the 
arguments in favor of another potential term in office, again, were mostly 
majoritarian in nature: a sovereign people ought to be able to decide 
democratically who they elect as their head of state and government. The 
route taking this time was that of a citizen initiative to call on Congress for 
a popular referendum on the question of constitutional reform. However, 
the jurisprudential issues that the Court answered in its deliberation were 
essentially the same: were correct procedures followed? And, Did Congress 
have the competence to initiate such a reform? 
First it established that it had the right to review a citizens’ initiative 
that, even though originating outside of the formal political institutions 
such as the Congress, does pass through Congress.13 It then moved to 
strictly procedural claims that were made against the reform project; and 
addressed the five complaints litigators had submitted to the Court during 
the litigation period. When a referendum for constitutional reform is 
convoked, its committee of promoters and supporters must inscribe with 
the National Register of the Civil State (Registraduría Nacional del Estado 
12  Interviewees noted that the political situation was the same as four years before, because 
the President was still very popular and powerful; but also noted that this popularity and 
power had left a noticeable damage in the institutional design of the nation. Already, before 
Uribe was elected for a second time, the Supreme Court had begun its official investigations 
into paramilitary relations within the Colombian Congress. The extent of these relations, 
however, only became clear after the election. In addition, the indictment of Mario Uribe, the 
President’s cousin, showed how close these relations were to the center of power. Furthermore, 
the involvement of paramilitaries in presidential and congressional elections at the regional level 
questioned the legitimacy of Uribe himself. To top it all off, DAS’s contribution in the infiltration 
of paramilitaries into Colombia’s democratic institutions made the threats emanating from 
excessive presidentialism and abuses of power very vivid. These “institutional scandals” resulted 
in the third scandal of institutional proportions: the wiretapping of judges and journalists with 
the decisive help of DAS. Some interviewees made clear that they considered these, from the 
perspective of a constitutional magistrate, the gravest of all the scandals..
13  Interviews and C-141/10.
24
BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC SECURITY AND DEMOCRATIC LEGALITY. CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND 
PRESIDENTIAL RE-ELECTION IN COLOMBIA
PRECEDENTE 2014 VOL. 5 / JULIO-DICIEMBRE, 9-40. CALI – COLOMBIA
Civil), and receive the support of 5 % of legible voters. The promoters 
raised the funds necessary, but did so with little respect to rules governing 
such campaigns. As Botero et al. write “the referendum records are murky 
and plagued with irregularities, such as self-loans between organizers that 
deliberately attempted to obscure the way in which the referendum was 
financed. Promoters spent six times more than the spending cap permitted”, 
with contributions by individual donors sometimes thirty times as high as 
allowed. In addition, Congress violated the requirement to have the votes 
of support confirmed by the National Register prior to vote on the bill, and 
went ahead without approval. The next violation concerned the wording 
of the referendum. The text placed before the electorate actually read that 
Uribe would run again in 2014. Promoters of the law assuaged this when 
the bill was already in Congress. The Court argued that Congress placed 
itself above the will of the people by changing the wording so late in the 
process, and it extra-limited itself (Botero, 2010). 
The aforementioned violations were material procedural violations of the 
law governing amendment processes of the Colombian Constitution. The 
final two procedural flaws were formal in nature and violated the domiciliary 
right - or house right - of the Colombian Congress. The majority backing 
reform in Congress had five Congresistas amongst their ranks who had joined 
Uribe’s party from another party (Cambio Radical). However, the laws against 
transfugismo disallowed such maneuvering between party caucuses, and Cambio 
Radical had sanctioned them what essentially invalidated their votes. Without 
their votes, the reform coalition did not have the required majority. Finally, 
the bill was struck down, because it was not passed within the time limit of 
the ordinary session that expired December 16th 2008 at 24:00. At that time, 
Uribe’s coalition had called in an extra-ordinary session that began at 00:05 of 
December 17th. However, since extra-ordinary sessions had to be published in 
the Diario Oficial 24 hours before, the session, too, was invalidated, and the 
ordinary session had expired long before.14
Thus, the Constitutional Court, based on procedural claims, declared the 
reform unconstitutional. Nevertheless, rules required the Court to also address 
the question of the substitution of the constitution. Here it found that the 
separation of powers is an axiomatic principle of the social state of law (Estado 
14  Interviews and C-141/10.
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Social del Derecho) that is inscribed in the first article of the Constitution. 
The substitution clause test requires the Court to investigate whether the 
proposed reform introduces a new element or whether it replaces an element 
from the original text. If it finds that the proposition, in its final analysis, 
contradicts the original norm, it must declare the reform unconstitutional 
for extra-limiting the competence of its author. In C-141/10, it argued that a 
third consecutive term in the Presidential office would destabilize the control 
mechanisms placed on the executive through other horizontal institutions. 
The Constitution from 1991 was designed so that the President’s nomination 
for offices that perform such control functions (such as the Attorney General, 
Federal Bank, etc.) could only minimally overlap for a short period of time 
at the end of the term. Thus, undercutting this periodization with another 
term in office, directly contradicted the principle of separation of power, 
which is implicit in the democratic principle of the Colombian Constitution 
(Art. 137). Arguing that Congress lacked the competence to initiate such 
far-reaching changes to an axiomatic principle of the Constitution, it closed 
the two ordinary paths of constitutional reform through Congress for any 
projects aiming to allow a change of the executive’s periods in office. Only a 
constituent assembly can now perform such a task.15
The substitution of the Constitution: a new authorization of political power
In Colombia’s constitutional context and in the context of the cases of 
constitutional reform tha are investigated here, the tension between 
majoritarian democracy and constitutionalism reappeared in the question 
whether the constitution has limits inherent to it that defy ordinary 
mechanisms for constitutional reform. It is here where the question of 
limitations to popular power poses itself anew. In either case of constitutional 
reform concerning presidential re-election, the Constitutional Court 
investigated strictly procedural complaints regarding the creation of the 
reform and claims that argue with the substitution clause. While the Court’s 
defiance towards the executive’s and legislative’s will and resilience for formal 
aspects of the Constitution is certainly laudable, and appear as evidence of 
the Court’s independence, it is doubtlessly its interpretation of constituent 
and constituted power in its substitution of the constitution theory that ranks 
15  Interview.
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higher in importance in its jurisprudence. It is one of the most controversial 
pieces of jurisprudence in the Court’s twenty year-old-history, and has not only 
the Colombian public discourse divided, but also separated the Court itself 
into opponents and supporters of the doctrine.
The theory was a direct response to Uribe’s healthy sense of mission and 
conviction over his own position in Colombia’s political history that he liberally 
displayed in constitutional matters. As explained above, from the beginning 
Uribe and his Minister of the Interior and Justice, Fernando Londoño Hoyos, 
aggressively approached constitutional reform to follow through with a 
fundamental element of their Democratic Security program: the creation of a 
more communitarian state. Also from the very beginning, the Court viewed this 
as a threat to the accomplishments of the 1991 Constitution –most notably to 
the protection of rights that had received a much more prevalent position in 
the jurisprudence thanks to the new Constitution–. The president of the Court, 
magistrate Luis Eduardo Montealegre, lamented the attack as the most profound 
assault on the Colombia social state of law, and likened the potential results to 
Fujimori’s Peru (El Tiempo, 2003). It was he, who penned the Court’s response 
to Uribe’s political reform from 200316, which included the first articulation of 
the theory of the substitution of the constitution (C-551/03).
Disconcerted by Uribe’s aggressive approach, the Court revisited the issue 
of reformability of the constitution again and asked whether the charter has 
implicit axiomatic principles that limit the ability of the secondary constituent 
(constituente segundario) to alter these basic principles. In order to perform 
this interpretive step it turned to the question of procedure in light of the 
competence of the actors involved. According to the Court, competence in 
a reform process only makes sense if it distinguishes between primary and 
secondary constituent power. It argued:
In the development of democratic principles and of popular sovereignty, 
the constituent power lies in the people, who have and preserve the 
power to give themselves a Constitution. The original constituent power, 
then, is not subjected to legal limits and implies, above all, the complete 
16  The reform included stipulations in three different fields: electoral reform and prohibitions 
to fight corruption, increasing transparency in budget debates, and overruling of several 
Constitutional Court decisions, which ranged from the minimum increase of public salaries to 
the admissibility of personal consumption of narcotics in private (Cepeda Espinosa, 2012).
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exercise of the political power by the relevant individuals. (...) On the 
other hand, the power of reform, or derivative constituent power, refers 
to the capacity certain organs of the State have, on some occasions, by 
consulting the citizens, to modify one existing Constitution, but within 
the paths determined by the [current] Constitution itself. This implies 
that it is a power established by the Constitution, and that is exercised 
under the conditions set by the same Constitution. Such conditions 
comprise matters of competence, procedure, etc. It deals, therefore, 
with the power of a reform of the Constitution itself and, in that sense, it 
is of constituent nature, but it is instituted by the existing Constitution 
and it is, therefore, derivative and limited (C-551/03).
With the distinction between constituent power and constituted power, the 
Court constructed a precedent for the competence to reform the constitution. 
When the Constitution holds in article 374 that it may be “amended by 
Congress, Constituent Assembly, or by the people through a referendum”, 
it implicitly recognizes this distinction, because “a power of reform without 
limitations of competence also eliminates the basic distinction between the 
original constituent power and the derived constituent power, or of reform” 
(C-551/03). The question of competence then becomes an issue of procedure, 
distinct from material review that examines the substantive constitutionality of 
a reform by comparing one article with a constitutional rule, norm, or principle. 
In a Marbury-vs-Madison-fashion, the Court declared the political 
referendum constitutional, but established the precedent for the doctrine of 
the substitution of the constitution. The first time that the Court struck down 
parts of a reform for substituting the Constitution was the 2005 reform to allow 
re-election. As explained above, a statutory law accompanying the reform 
gave transitory powers to the Council of State,a judicial body.17 In 2003, the 
Court had simply manifested that, to detect a substitution, the Court must 
analyze the principles and values of the Constitution. In 2005, it clarified and 
defined substitution of the constitution when “one of its defining elements, 
instead of being amended, is replaced by an opposing or wholly different one. 
Substituting implies that the resulting text contradicts the core of the 1991 
Constitution and that, therefore, it is no longer recognizable” (C-551/03). 
17  The reform read: [i]f the Congress were not able to issue the statutory law within the deadline 
established, or were it declared void by the Constitutional Court, the Council of State will provisionally 
issue regulations on the matter during a two-month period.” (Cited in C-1040/05).
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The primary task the Court has to fulfill is to identify those defining 
elements of the Constitution –critiques would say decide on its core elements–. 
The Court held that it avoids legal subjectivism by applying a three-tiered test: 
i.) identify the core element; ii.) Reference multiple constitutional provisions 
to define its specificity within the 1991 Constitution; iii.) Show its importance 
in the comprehensive constitutional context. From here it can then move on 
to comparing the original element with the new element, in order to estimate 
whether the new element is different, to the degree of incompatibility, with the 
original document (Cepeda Espinosa, 2012: 76). 
The Court found that one immediate presidential re-election does not alter 
Colombia’s position as a social state of law, nor does it replace its presidential 
system with another one, but only modifies the existing one. There was 
dissent on the Court, with magistrate Cordoba lamenting procedural 
violations, and magistrate Araujo arguing that the Constitution indeed was 
substituted. Magistrate Sierra Porto did not dissent from the verdict itself, 
but argued that the Court should have declared itself incompetent for the 
substitution review, since it amounted to material review –an imperative 
that the Constitution explicitly denied the Court–. His dissent is the most 
articulated critique of the doctrine of the substitution of the constitution. 
Thus, it is worth to take a quick look at his argument.
The issue of contention between proponents of the doctrine of competence 
flaws rests on the issue of competence on the one hand, and the question of 
axiomatic principles on the other. Sierra Porto relies on a more formal and textual 
interpretation of the constitution, arguing that the Constitution articulates three 
mechanisms for constitutional reform, and that the same text also dictates that 
the requirements in these processes are only procedural. In his words, inventing 
axiomatic principles ignores the original text of the constitution and intention 
of the constituent. The constituent representatives in the assembly discussed 
the issue of material review of constitutional reform, and as a response to the 
intransience of the old Supreme Court in letting constitutional reform pass, 
deliberately opted for the option of procedural review. 
He goes on to insist that “the construction of a ‘major premise’ in the 
substitution judgment is a construction of material parameter” because it is 
“up to the constitutional judge to identify what are the essential elements 
of the 1991 Constitution, in order to make the substitution test”. He doubts 
that the substitution test strips the judge of subjectivism, “when precisely all 
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that is described that is done is the ultimate expression of this; he [the judge] 
identifies the essential element, demonstrates its essential nature and defines 
it in the Constitution. He escapes any objective elements in this operation, 
and exercises a typical decisionism that is criticized by the judiciary”.18
Invoking legal decisionism, the account then turns against the differentiation 
between constituent and constituted power as not very consistently applied 
in the theory of substituting the constitution. Sierra Porto holds that this 
distinction “deliberately ignores the fact that the power to amend a constitution 
is a constituent power, even if you want to call it derived, limited, or else. For 
once a Constitution is established the whole exercise of constituent power is 
derivative or constituted, as it must operate within the channels or limits in 
the Constitution.” Holding that Congress cannot replace the Constitution as 
a mere power of reform can also serve to stifle popular sovereignty, even if it 
acts as a constituent. Sierra Porto concludes that for a judicial body to assume 
a position from where to decide which aspects can be subject to popular vote 
undermines the democratic foundations of the political system.19 
The substitution theory was utilized for the first time to strike down a reform 
in its entirety in the 2010 case concerning re-election. Humberto Sierra Porto 
had an exposed role in the second case of re-election reform as the magistrate 
who prepared the initial legal study to commence deliberation within the Court. 
I will speak to the details of the institutionalization of deliberative process 
within the Court below. At this point, it suffices to mention that his ponencia 
(as the initial study is referred to) encompassed procedural complaints only. 
As evidenced by his dissent, which was outlined above, Sierra Porto brought 
his legal positivist convictions into his jurisprudence, and remained loyal to 
his opposition to the substitution theory. The decision he promoted wanted to 
declare the reform unconstitutional on procedural grounds, but refrained from 
the competence test. It had a 7-2 majority, but five magistrates insisted that 
rules dictate an all-encompassing jurisprudential analysis, which also must 
include the subject of substitution.20  
The argument construted by the five judges begins with the premise 
that the first decision, regarding presidential re-election in 2005 set a 
precedent and allowed to change the norm to one immediate re-election of 
18  Interviews and Humberto Sierra Porto, C-1040/05; p. 771.
19  Interviews and Humberto Sierra Porto, C-1040/05;. p. 774-775.
20  Interview.
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the President. They upheld that this limitation is well-grounded, because 
the term limits placed on a president –in particular in a context of hyper-
presidentialism– directly touches on the horizontal institutionalization of the 
separation of powers. Constituents in 1990, who were aware of the excesses 
of presidentialism in South America, had intended to balance executive 
power, by minimizing the time overlap in office between institutions that 
function as a check on the President, but in which the mandate holder 
has had a part in appointing. This includes important judicial positions 
such as the attorney general, and appointments to Federal Bank that are 
constitutionally mandated to act independent of the political branches of 
government.  The magistrates argued that another term in the presidency 
undermined such a counter-cyclical periodization of offices, and irreparably 
damaged the equilibrium between the branches of government.
 The unmitigated tilting of the balance of power altered the major premise 
of the separation of powers implicit in the organization of the Colombian 
state as a social state of law (article 1), transforming it beyond recognition. 
Thus, it concluded that due to the incompatibility between original norm and 
its modification in the reform, the referendum constituted a substitution of 
the constitution, for which Congress lacked competence. The final vote was 
5-4, the doctrine stands.21 
Deliberation within the Court: the institutionalization of the tranquility of 
the process
As shown, the fact that the test of competence was applied in the deliberation 
of the presidential re-election case had a lot to do with the institutionalization 
of procedure within the Court. Thus, one of the contentions of my research 
was to investigate this institutionalization. It has shown that deliberation, and 
the institutionalization thereof is a reminder of the peculiar and contentious 
position of a judicial court that subjects the legislature and executive to the 
rule of law. We need to recall that judicial review institutions face very specific 
critiques in their task of defending the rather mysterious political ideal of 
the rule of law: they lack direct democratic legitimacy, but must control 
those representative institutions that have been democratically elected, and 
reflect (ideally) the various interests that constitute the political society of 
21  Interviews.
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a given country. Thus, the institutionalization of the deliberation processes 
aims at the mitigation of the lack of democratic legitimacy, while at the 
same time maintaining the independence and autonomy in judgment that 
are required for the exercise of impartial judicial review. The research has 
shown that the institutionalization of deliberation and procedure within the 
court follows a conscious and transparent script which aims at assuaging the 
Court’s particular legitimacy conundrum, by enabling what one interviewee 
termed the tranquility of the process.22 
The Constitutional Court in Colombia, as a deliberative body, is tasked 
with two types of reviews: abstract reviews of laws and constitutional reforms, 
and rights review of Tutela complaints (Art. 241, 1-11). Consistent with 
the number of tasks, there are two different types of revision courts in the 
Constitutional Court: one for revisions of Tutelas and the Sala Plena. The 
former consists of three magistrates and the latter of all nine. Most Tutelas are 
decided in the revision court.However, important Tutelas and reunification 
Tutelas that unify the jurisprudence are always decided in Sala Plena.
Deliberation over a particular begins with the random selection of a ponencia 
from the nine magistrates. The elected ponente is tasked with preparing an 
initial study into the juridical questions posed by a particular constitutional 
case. In this case whether the constitution’s procedural proviso were violated 
in the creation of constitutional reform (which also implies the question of 
competence). The ponente then prepares his/her “project” together with his 
dispatch and distributes it to the other magistrates. Based on this ponencia, 
they research their own take on this issue. This exchange takes place around 
ten days before the deliberation begins in the Sala Plena. When everyone is 
well prepared then they are summoned for the deliberation in the Sala Plena, 
where only the magistrates and the general secretary are present. Here, the 
President of the Court, who is annually elected by the Court itself, directs 
the conversation. Eventually, the project of the ponente is put to a vote and 
passes as decided if it can yield a five-vote majority. If not, as was the case of 
the second re-election, in which Sierra Porto presented a ponencia without the 
competence test, the ponencia moves to one of the contending magistrates, 
and he/she prepares a study that reflects the critique. This is repeated until 
the Court reaches a majority, which is then presented by the President to the 
22  This entire section is based on interviews conducted by the author.
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public and somewhat later published as the reasoned decision. The reasoned 
decision includes only those ponencias that have passed the majority in the 
court and not the minutes of the conversation nor the rejected ponencias. In 
important cases, though, a magistrate can publish his dissent on a particular 
clause in the reasoned decision, but this has not occurred very often.
The systemic organization of argumentation, which reflects the way 
university seminars are conducted, speaks to the nature of the constitutional 
judge. Interviewees explained that viewing themselves as apolitical and 
asocial beings would amount to deliberate delusion; with the election to the 
constitutional tribunal, the magistrates do not attain herculean capabilities 
that place them in a juridical mount Olympus, liberated from human 
predispositions, as Dworkin theorized. On the contrary, subjects made 
abundantly clear that all judges have experienced a unique socialization that 
exposed them to particular preferences, biases, and ideologies. These cannot be 
switched-off. Rather, the process and institutionalization of deliberation ought 
to minimize socio-political biases. The informal rules accompanying the formal 
institutionalization of deliberation stresses that impression, too. In order to let 
juridical argumentation prevail over political argumentation (or arguments of 
convenience), magistrates go to great lengths in order to protect the integrity 
of the Sala Plena as the sine qua non of the Courts independence. 
First, informal rules concern the interaction of the Court with the public. Of 
course, the criticalness of public interaction is heightened by the fact that the 
Court is a deliberative but unelected body, and thus lacks the direct legitimacy 
of free and fair election. This is a fact that does not go unnoticed by magistrates. 
However, the strategy to overcome this deficiency of democratic legitimation 
does not consist of increased public exposure of judges and their individual 
opinions, but rather an assertion of their autonomy and independence as a 
collective body. Then the imperative becomes to defend the “tranquility of the 
process”. It is exactly the tranquility of the process that is endangered by too 
much public exposure; pressures from the parties and the organized interest that 
could be affected by a particular decision would mount, the process of deliberation 
affected, and the coherence of their argumentation questioned.
The most damaging critique against the discourse of a magistrate is that it is 
politically motivated and not guided by principles implicit or explicit in the law 
of the land. The guidance for public interaction followed by magistrates must 
be viewed under these aspects. As a consequence the Court followed fairly 
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clear rules when it comes to the interaction with the public. The overarching 
maxim is that the Court speaks as a unified whole and not as a conglomerate of 
particular opinions. Before a decision, the Court only invites arguments sent in 
for the litigation. It never speaks back, but only collects these arguments and 
organizes them. They can be found in the reasoned decisions. 
When it comes to public debate, the line becomes still finer: As a public 
institution that makes crucial decision of high public importance, the Court 
cannot withdraw entirely from the debate –in particular, since it faces 
peculiar legitimation issues–. Nevertheless, the posture by the Court in such 
engagement with the public is best described as extremely cautious. There are 
interviews with the Court and the printed press.23 It is readily apparent that 
these are fairly tightly managed by the magistrate. It begins with the fact that 
only the current President of the Court speaks in interviews with the media. 
The informational degree of such interviews, however, is fairly minuscule. 
Since positions within the Court are supposed to be kept secret, the President 
of the Court does not speak about any of them. Noticeably, he or she only 
speaks in the third person and if asked about precise juridical question, he 
proceeds to answer just stating that the Sala Plena will have to analyze the 
issue. Thus, these interviews are much more an exercise of pedagogy than 
political interaction: the Court wants to inform the public about the juridical 
questions at hand, but never reveals who holds what opinion on the Court.
Moving from the macro to the micro level interaction, the research identified 
certain parameters of interaction that magistrates within the Court oblige each 
other with in order to uphold the integrity of the Sala Plena –or the Coliseum 
as one magistrate referred to it. In a workshop with the Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung in Bogotá, magistrate Mauricio González explained that the task is 
to bring arguments to the Sala Plena. Evidently, there is interaction between 
magistrates before a decision or a deliberation process, but these are purely 
social and never involve the issues to be discussed. This precludes political 
discussions on a particular question and juridical questions. The preparation 
for a particular project is between the magistrate and his dispatch of auxiliary 
judges that support the judge. Even less accepted are quid pro quo debates 
between magistrates. The judge was adamant in his presentation that judges 
do not agree on votes for each other’s projects before the deliberation takes 
23  I have not come across interviews in television or radio.
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place. In his words, such collegiality would mean the end of the deliberative 
body itself. The auxiliary judges in the dispatches of the various magistrates do 
talk to each other. As reported, these discussions are also strictly juridical and 
can be appropriately characterized as an exchange of know-how.
The lack of direct legitimacy, in the magistrates’ opinions, shifts the burden 
to the effort of mitigate their democratic deficit to the coherence of the 
argumentation: “In the end, the weapon of a judge is his discourse. It depends 
on his language, its coherence, its logic”.24 The most damaging accusation, 
of course, would be that this discourse is a discourse of convenience and 
not of juridical values. The investigation showed that the coherence of the 
argumentation relies on the integrity of the Sala Plena and the juridical nature 
of the deliberation taking place therein. The resulting strategy is then to 
minimize the outside exposure of the deliberation process itself –including 
one’s own position– in order to 1) minimize external undue pressure and 2) 
avert accusations of bias. The generic motto then is to guarantee the autonomy 
of legal reasoning by protecting the tranquility of the process of deliberation.
Conclusion
When the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional a potential third 
term in the Presidency in 2010, it manifestly displayed its own institutional 
independence. President Álvaro Uribe occupied the mandate with charisma 
and a sense of mission that led him in many instances to test the borders 
of constitutional limits. Part of his political program as well as his political 
persona displayed a distaste for limits on popular elected officials. Together 
with the wide-spread public support he and his Democratic Security enjoyed, 
his constitutional reform agenda was posed as a threat to the integrity of 
the 1991 Constitution project, of which the Constitutional Court was an 
integral part. If we add to these factors the generically weak conditions 
of Colombia’s state and political institutions, the display of the Court’s 
institutional independence becomes even more remarkable.
The key part of the Court’s decision was the so-called substitution doctrine. 
This theory exemplifies the spirit of the 1991 Constitution, in that it invokes, 
under the banner of constituent power, a pluralistic decision that is prior to the 
constituted polity. Shifting the locus of “original” power from a unified will –as 
24  Interviews.
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is the case in Schmittean conceptualizations– to a pluralistic will, not only lifts 
the metaphysical veil from the concept itself, but also liberates it from being 
a tool for executive domination. The court accepted Schmitt’s affirmation of 
the difference between reforming the constitution and changing it, but since 
the Constitution speaks of ways to reform it for all bodies constituted by that 
Constitution (legislature, executive, judiciary, etc.), substituting it is outside 
of their competence. It defended its right to test for competence, because 
competence is an integral part of procedure, subjecting it to the Court’s 
imperative to formal judicial review. 
Constructing the doctrine of the theory of the substitution was a direct 
response to Uribe and his politics. It was also during his tenure as President 
that the Court developed the jurisprudence and, in its final consequence, 
utilized the doctrine to strike down a reform in its entirety on competence 
grounds. Thus, the two cases of constitutional reform also eclipse the time 
span, in which the Court created a doctrine, developed its principles, and, 
finally, applied it to strike down a constitutional reform. It thereby displayed a 
remarkable degree of institutional robustness.
Finally, the paper pointed to the institutionalization of discourse in the 
Court as an important factor for the Court’s independence. Aware of the 
counter majoritarian difficulty, but loyal to its counter majoritarian task, 
magistrates on the Court hold that the coherence of the discourse is the 
judge’s most important line of defense against accusations of bias and political 
argumentation. Then the generic motto is to guarantee the autonomy of legal 
reasoning by protecting the tranquility of the process of deliberation. The 
followed procedures are formal rules – such as the selection of the President, 
the drawing of the ponente, and the house rules – that are accompanied by 
informal rules – such as not conversing about cases outside the Sala Plena, not 
reveal positions within the Court to the public, and insist on the argumentation 
as juridical and not political – that together conjoin to buttress the sanctity of 
the process.
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In total, I conducted over 40 in-depth elite interviews with persons directly 
or indirectly involved with the Constitutional Court of Colombia as well as 
persons, who occupy prominent positions in the analysis of the actions by 
the Constitutional Court, such as professors of law of the most important law 
schools in the country as well as persons engaged with NGOs that are involved 
in litigation Constitutional Court cases. The interviewees consisted of all 
magistrates of Colombia’s Constitutional Court, who were on the Court in 
2010 when the decision regarding a law to call for referendum to allow a second 
re-election was decided save for one, whose auxiliary judge I interviewed. I 
also interviewed four of the nine members of the Constitutional Court that 
decided the decision regarding the law to permit constitutional change for a 
first re-election of the President of the Republic. Furthermore, the interviews 
consisted of auxiliary judges of eight different magistrates of the Court from 
different periods. The interviewee list also included three magistrates from 
the Supreme Court of the Republic. Finally, I interviewed three journalists, 
four Senators and Representatives from the Camerá, ten professors of law 
and political science with specialization in legal politics and judicial/political 
culture, and five activists from NGOs litigating Constitutional Court cases. 
The selection resulted from an analysis of the sentences by the Constitutional 
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Court, a survey of the literature on judicial politics in Colombia as well as an 
archival research of the most important journalistic publications in Colombia 
(La Revista Semana, El Tiempo, El Espectador, La Revista Cambio).
The interviews were in-depth and focused on the issues resulting from the 
content analysis of publications. They lasted between one hour to two and a 
half hours. The questions were structured according to these topics: 
Democracy and Constitutionality
•	 Sovereignty of the people and constitutional reform
•	 The role of the judiciary in the Colombian Constitution
•	 What is the legal culture (Cultura Legalista) in Colombia and how has it 
changed since the new constitution in 1991?
 
Judiciary and the media:
•	 The press and publicity as democratic phenomena.
•	 The impact of media discourse on decisions by the Court.
•	 How does the Court communicate with the media? Is it legitimate?
 
Deliberation and institutionalism
•	 The role of deliberation amongst magistrates before and during the pro-
cess of reaching a decision.
•	 Can you describe the deliberations regarding re-election?
Uribe, democratic security and re-election
•	 What was the importance of democratic security and did it justify re-
election?
•	 What were the important changes between the first and second decision 
regarding constitutional reform and re-election?
•	 How did the political scandals affect the decision?
•	 What importance did the revelation regarding the so-called Yidispolitica 
scandal have? 
•	 How important were the official investigations by the Supreme Court in 
the parapolitica scandal?
•	 Did the image of an institutional crisis resulting from a negative decision 
regarding re-election matter in deliberations?
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As is evident in the outline above, the questions were semi-structured, but left 
the interviewee sufficient leeway in answering the question openly. Questions 
also involved follow-up questions for clarification. 
The interviews were transcribed and analytically structured according 
to the topics given in the questions. Most often this corresponded to the 
chronology of the interview, but due to the open-ended nature of the 
questions, in some cases the interviewee made statements that could also be 
subsumed under another topic. In the analysis, the structuring of the interview 
contents according to topics was complemented by an ordering of first, 
second, and third order observation of the position of the interviewees. Thus, 
magistrates belong into the first category, auxiliary judges into the second, 
and observer and interpreters of jurisprudence of the Court into the third 
category. The epistemological question remains whether this also implies a 
hierarchical ordering of the content or whether these are simply descriptive 
analytical categories. While it is true that the magistrates are the closest to 
the decisions, since they are actively involved, they are also more likely to 
produce pre-structured answers to questions regarding the role of the judge in 
the constitutional politics of Colombia – after all their imperative is to make 
judgments based on established constitutional norms and legal categories. 
Conversely, auxiliary judges can be seen in a position to answer more freely, 
since they are not directly involved nor is their role defined by norms of 
independence and autonomy that requires aforementioned pre-structured 
reasoning.  

